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NOTES
THE EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE TO MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE ACTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA - McGill v.
French
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the courts' view of the physician-patient rela-
tionship was based on the assumption that the physician had
knowledge superior to that of the patient, who was regarded as
having very little knowledge and experience with medical issues.'
This assumption has gradually faded over the years and the phy-
sician and patient are now placed on practically equal footing.2
The courts now impute increased knowledge and awareness of
health care issues to the patient.3
As a result, physicians have attacked medical malpractice
claims with increasing vigor. No longer can the patient plead igno-
rance to justify his own negligence.
It is a well settled rule of law that when a patient has by his own
negligence, imprudence, or disregard of the directions of his physi-
cian, directly contributed to the aggravation of his disease or dis-
order, he cannot recover damages for anything which is the result
of mere negligence or unsuccessful treatment by the physician.4
The determination of whether a patient has been negligent
rests upon the circumstances of the individual case.5 The jurisdic-
1. Sharon W. Murphey, Comment, Contributory Negligence in Medical
Malpractice: Are the Standards Changing to Reflect Society's Growing Health
Care Consumerism?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 151 (1991).
2. Id. at 152.
3. Id.
4. CHARLES F. BEACH JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OR NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE § 406, at 583 (John J. Crawford ed.,
3rd ed. 1899).
5. L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk as
Defense in Action Against Physician or Surgeon for Malpractice, 50 A.L.R. 2d
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tions that have recognized the defense of contributory negligence
in medical malpractice actions have granted a remedy in the form
of either barring the patient's recovery,6 or reducing the patient's
damages.' Despite the widespread use of the contributory negli-
gence defense in other jurisdictions, prior to 1993 North Carolina
declined to allow a defendant to succeed on the defense in medical
malpractice actions.8
As a result of McGill v. French,9 a patient who fails to follow
the advice of the physician may be challenged with the contribu-
tory negligence defense in a suit alleging medical malpractice. In
McGill, the court held a patient may be barred from recovering in
a medical malpractice action if the patient fails to follow the phy-
sician's instructions or advice by not keeping scheduled appoint-
ments. 10 This decision could inhibit future claims of medical
malpractice since the patient may be completely barred from
recovery though only partially at fault." The decision emphasizes
the patient's responsibility for his own care and return visits for
follow-up care.' 2
This Note will examine the defense of contributory negli-
gence, the prerequisites for asserting the defense, and the under-
lying policy reasons which may explain the rampant growth of the
defense and its alleged recent decline. Next, this Note will evalu-
ate the circumstances which have given rise to contributory negli-
gence as well as those circumstances that do not rise to the level of
contributory negligence. Finally, this Note will analyze the North
1043, 1045 (1956); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 303
(1981).
6. See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988) (if patient is fifty
percent or more at fault then recovery is barred).
7. See, e.g., Roers v. Engebretson, 479 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(patient's damages reduced in proportion to amount of patient's fault).
8. McGill v. French, 333 N.C. 209, 424 S.E.2d 108 (1.993); see also Powell v.
Shull, 58 N.C. App. 68, 239 S.E.2d 259 (1982), rev. denied, 306 N.C. 743, 295
S.E.2d 479 (1982) (failure to return to doctor's office did not contribute to the
patient's injury); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978)
(fact that patient becomes addicted to narcotic drugs, continues in doctor's care
and knowingly continues his addiction does not make him contributorily
negligent).
9. 333 N.C. 209, 424 S.E.2d 108 (1993).
10. Id.
11. See William F. Horsley, The Argument for Comparative Fault, 38 N.C. ST.
B.Q., 18, 19 (Fall 1991) ("An archaic law, one of doubtful ancestry, continues to
place 100% of the loss on victims who are no more than 1% at fault.").
12. McGill, 333 N.C. at 220-21, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
104 [Vol. 16:103
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Carolina Supreme Court's decision to permit the defense when the
patient fails to follow the physician's advice and instructions.
II. THE CASE
Plaintiff, Daniel McGill, filed a medical malpractice action
against defendant, Dr. Thomas N. French, and the clinic which
employed him.13 Mr. McGill was referred to Dr. French in July
1982 by Dr. Donald Woolfolk,14 who had treated Mr. McGill prior
to June 1982 for emphysema and two heart attacks.' 5 After tests
were completed, Dr. French diagnosed Mr. McGill with a mild pro-
static enlargement.' 6 However, attempts to get in touch with Mr.
McGill to communicate the test results were unsuccessful. 17
Over a year passed before Dr. French saw Mr. McGill again.' 8
In August 1983, Mr. McGill sought treatment for urinary reten-
tion at the hospital emergency room." Mr. McGill was hospital-
ized and Dr. French performed a prostatectomy. 20 The
prostatectomy revealed Mr. McGill had prostatic cancer;21 how-
ever, Mr. McGill was not informed of the diagnosis before dis-
charge from the hospital because it was not included in his
medical chart.22
The following month, Mr. McGill returned to Dr. French's
office and was informed of the prostate cancer diagnosis.23 Dr.
French explained that the cancer was malignant,24 that it was
13. Id. at 211, 424 S.E.2d at 109.
14. Id. at 212, 424 S.E.2d at 110.
15. Id. In June 1982, Dr. Woolfolk referred plaintiff to Dr. Thomas Barnett at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Medicine for breathing
problems. Id. Dr. Barnett recommended plaintiff see a urologist for further
consultation after discovering a prostatic enlargement. Id. Plaintiff then saw Dr.
French in July 1982. Id. A prostatic enlargement is an enlargement of the
chestnut-shaped body that surrounds the beginning of the urethra in the male
and secretes a milky fluid at time of the emission of semen. STEDMANWS MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1150 (24th ed. 1982).
16. McGill, 333 N.C. at 212, 424 S.E.2d at 110.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. A prostatectomy is a surgical procedure to remove all or a part of the
prostate. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1150.
21. McGill, 333 N.C. at 212, 424 S.E.2d at 110.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. A malignancy occurs in severe form, is resistant to treatment and is
frequently fatal. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 829.
1994] 105
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going to cause problems soon, and that a close watch should be
kept for the first sign of back or bone pain or any other difficulty. 25
Treatment was not administered at this time, but Dr. French told
Mr. McGill to return promptly when asked and upon his first
experience of pain or discomfort.26 The next appointment was
scheduled for October.27
Mr. McGill returned to Dr. French's office prior to his sched-
uled appointment but missed his scheduled appointment. 28 No
complaints of pain were made at this time.29 Dr. French reiterated
the September discussion with Mr. McGill.30 In addition, Dr.
French told Mr. McGill that it did not matter when treatment
began because it would not change his life expectancy or quality of
life since he was asymptomatic and in an advanced stage of carci-
noma.3 ' Thereafter, Mr. McGill missed a scheduled appointment
in January 1984.32 According to Dr. French, a notice was sent to
plaintiff after Mr. McGill missed the appointment.33
Mr. McGill's complaint alleged a variation on these facts. The
most significant variation was an allegation that Dr. French never
told him of the diagnosis.34 In June 1984, Mr. McGill returned to
Dr. Woolfolk's office complaining of stomach pain.35 After hospi-
talizing Mr. McGill, Dr. Woolfolk rechecked the medical records
and found the diagnosis.36 The diagnosis was then communicated
to Mr. McGill. 37 Dr. Woolfolk called Dr. French in for consulta-
tion.38 Treatment was recommended and commenced by Dr.
25. McGill, 333 N.C. at 212-13, 424 S.E.2d at 110.
26. McGill, 333 N.C. at 213, 424 S.E.2d at 110.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Defendant's nurse testified she had the responsibility of contacting a
cancer patient who missed an appointment. Id. Her efforts included attempting
several calls a day and if unsuccessful, then a postcard was sent to the patient.
Id.
34. Id. at 213, 424 S.E.2d at 111.
35. Id. at 213, 424 S.E.2d at 111.
36. Id. at 214, 424 S.E.2d at 111.
37. Id.
38. Id.
106 [Vol. 16:103
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French.39 The day after treatment began Mr. McGill was dis-
charged and a follow-up appointment was scheduled for July.40
Mr. McGill did not keep this appointment and had no further con-
tact with Dr. French. 4 1
Dr. Woolfolk referred Mr. McGill to Duke Hospital where Dr.
David F. Paulson performed a bilateral orchiectomy42 in July 1984
after discovering the cancer had spread to the bones.43 Thereafter,
Mr. McGill was in and out of the hospital several times until his
death in January 1991.44
At trial, judgment was entered on the jury verdict finding
negligence on the part of Dr. French and contributory negligence
on the part of Mr. McGill, thereby dismissing the cause of action.45
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the entry of judg-
ment on the verdict and held the trial court should not have sub-
mitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury for two
reasons.46 First, the court presumed Dr. French's negligence was
based upon the failure to inform Mr. McGill of the diagnosis which
was only one of several allegations of negligence.47 The court con-
cluded that if Mr. McGill had no knowledge of the diagnosis then
he could not possibly have been negligent.48 Second, the court
found Dr. French failed to prove Mr. McGill's injuries were proxi-
39. Id. Plaintiffs wife stated she asked defendant why he did not inform them
of the diagnosis and he answered that it did not make any difference when
treatment began. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A bilateral orchiectomy is a surgical procedure to remove both testes.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY, supra note 15, at 992.
43. McGill, 333 N.C. at 214, 424 S.E.2d at 111.
44. Id. From December 1984 through January 1985, plaintiff was hospitalized
for two malignant tumors on his colon. Id. Plaintiff returned to the hospital from
January 1985 until March 1985 to be treated for pneumonia. Id. Plaintiff
underwent radiation treatment from April 1986 until June 1986. Id. He was
subsequently hospitalized several times for pneumonia from October 1986
through January 1990. Id.
45. Id. at 209, 424 S.E.2d at 108.
46. Id. at 211, 424 S.E.2d at 109.
47. Id. at 215,424 S.E.2d at 111. The theories of negligence advanced were (1)
failure to institute therapy in 1982, (2) failure to notify referring physician of
suspicions in 1982, (3) failure to tell plaintiff of diagnosis, (4) failure to institute
therapy in 1983, (5) failure to notify plaintiffs physicians in 1983, (6) failure to
monitor with tests, and (7) failure to inform plaintiffs physician that plaintiff did
not come in for follow-up treatment in 1983. Id. at 215, 424 S.E.2d at 112.
48. Id.
1994]
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mately caused by his own negligence. 49 The court found the miss-
ing link to be the absence of medical testimony establishing a
causal connection between the missed appointments and the inju-
ries.10 The court of appeals remanded for a new trial on damages
only. 5 1
On discretionary review, the supreme court stated three con-
clusions. First, the supreme court concluded that the court of
appeals erred in assuming the basis for the trial court's finding of
negligence was based upon the defendant's failure to inform the
plaintiff of his cancer.52 The court explained that a reviewing
court was not in the position to determine the basis upon which
the jury based its verdict without a clear showing of record.53 Sec-
ond, the court held that proximate cause does not require the
defendant to present medical expert testimony in all cases of con-
tributory negligence.5 4 Finally, the court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence for a jury to find a causal connection between
missed appointments and the spread or the increased rate of the
spread of cancer.55 The court ordered the case remanded to the
trial court for reinstatement of the judgment entered on the jury
verdict. 56
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of the Defense and the Theoretical Basis
Behind Its Development
Contributory negligence is defined as "conduct on the part of
the plaintiff, which contributes to the harm suffered and which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection."57 The origin of this affirmative defense dates
back to the English decision, Butterfield v. Forrester. 58 Butterfield
set the stage for a litigation revolution. 59 Lord Ellenborough's
49. Id. at 217, 424 S.E.2d at 113.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 211, 424 S.E.2d at 109.
52. Id. at 216, 424 S.E.2d at 112.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 218, 424 S.E.2d at 113.
55. Id. at 221, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
56. Id.
57. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65,
at 451 (5th ed. 1984).
58. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
59. BEACH, supra note 4, § 8, at 8.
[Vol. 16:103
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opinion in the case recognized that a plaintiff must use "common
and ordinary caution for his own care," thereby relieving the
defendant of responsibility for the damage/injury caused by his
lack of care.60 The defense has increasingly appeared in negli-
gence actions over the years and has emerged as one of the most
common defenses in a negligence action.6 '
A leading commentator on the subject of tort law has traced
the development of contributory negligence as a defense during
the nineteenth century to several factors: 62 (1)the distrust of
plaintiff sympathetic juries and the desire to limit the liability of
growing industry;63 (2)the tendency to look for a single proximate
cause for each injury;64 and (3)the courts' inability to create a
formula for apportioning damages for a single injury between the
parties.6" Therefore, though both parties were at fault, only one
bore the loSS. 6 6
The general rules governing the defense of contributory negli-
gence apply to negligence actions asserted by the patient against
his physician. 67 Generally, when the patient's negligence or the
negligence of those acting for him proximately causes or contrib-
utes to the injury incurred, the patient's contemplated recovery is
either barred 61 or damages are reduced 69 by the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the patient.7 0 The circumstances under
which the defense either bars or reduces recovery vary since each
case is reviewed independently.7 1
Various theories have been promulgated to explain the gen-
eral function of the contributory negligence doctrine.72 One theory
is that the defense serves a penal function as it denies recovery to
60. BEACH, supra note 4, § 9, at 9.
61. KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, § 65, at 451.
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. (citing Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,
41 Nw. U. L. REV. 151 (1947), and arguing that this was the primary factor).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Tellier, supra note 5, at 1047. For more history on the development of the
defense see Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691
(1953).
68. See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988).
69. See, e.g., Roers v. Engebretson, 479 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
70. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 80 (1987).
71. Tellier, supra note 5, at 1045.
72. KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, § 65, at 452.
1994] 109
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the plaintiff due to his own lack of due care.73 Another theory is
that the plaintiff must come into court with clean hands.7 ' The
theory advanced by the majority of courts relates to proximate
cause. 75 Most courts frame their opinion in terms of whose negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the injury.7 6
"'Proximate cause' is that cause of an injury which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury would
not have occurred, or it is that act or omission which immediately
causes or fails to prevent the injury. " 7 7 Generally, recovery is
denied if the patient's negligence is a concurring cause78 that is
"simultaneous and cooperating with the fault of the physician."79
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurring subsequent to the
physician's negligence will reduce the patient's damages in pro-
portion to his share of the negligence.8 0 While the patient's negli-
gence does not have to be the sole cause of the injury or damage
suffered, it must be a proximate cause to prevent or reduce
recovery.
Contributory negligence developed in reaction to the judicial
and societal belief that wrongdoers should not be granted relief.s '
In recent years, the defense has suffered criticism as an antique
doctrine which has become unsuitable for a changing society. 2 As
social attitudes change, the law must follow. The primary concern
73. Id. (citing Wakelin v. London & S.W.R. Co., 12 A.C. 41, 45 (1886)).
74. Id. (citing Davis v. Guarnieri, 15 N.E. 350 (Ohio 1887)).
75. Id. (citing Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 697 (1897); Gilman v.
Central Vermont Railway Co., 107 A. 122 (Vt. 1919); Ware v. Saufley, 237 S.W.
1060 (Ky. 1922); Exum v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 154 N.C. 408, 70 S.E.
845; Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Wills, 68 S.E. 395 (Va. 1910)).
76. Id.
77. Tellier, supra note 5, at 1044.
78. See, e.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970); Halverson v.
Zimmerman, 232 N.W. 754 (N.D. 1930) ; Sendejar v. Alice Physicians & Surgeons
Hosp., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Lawrence v. Wirth, 309 S.E.2d
315 (Va. 1983).
79. Tellier, supra note 5, at 1046.
80. See cases cited supra note 78.
81. See Robert A. Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1
ARY. L. REV. 1 (1946).
82. Criticism of the defense can be found in Leflar, supra note 81. See also
Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953). But see
Richard T. Boyette, A Case Against Comparative Negligence, 38 N.C. ST. B.Q. 22
(Fall 1991) (discussion supporting the continued viability of contributory
negligence).
110 [Vol. 16:103
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of the courts today appears to be just compensation of injured per-
sons."3 Contributory negligence has lost its original rigor and has
undergone surgery by courts attempting to modify the doctrine to
ameliorate what appear to be harsh effects in an era concerned
with providing a remedy for the victim of negligence. The trend is
away from barring recovery to reducing recovery
proportionately.8
4
B. Contributory Negligence in Medical Malpractice
1. Circumstances in Which the Defense Has Been Successful
In general, the circumstances under which the defense of con-
tributory negligence has been successful are limited to three pri-
mary fact patterns: (1) failure on the part of the patient to disclose
a complete and accurate medical history;85 (2) patient's refusal to
cooperate with the physician in diagnosis or treatment;8 and (3)
failure to return for further treatment or failure to follow other
instructions.
a. Failure to Disclose Complete and Accurate Medical History.
The failure of an individual to provide the physician with a com-
plete and accurate medical history may bar recovery.88 There are
qualifications and limits which apply to the defense in these cir-
cumstances. First, the patient is not required to volunteer infor-
83. See generally Leflar, supra note 81 (discussing the change in social
viewpoint and the disfavor of the defense by the courts).
84. For a discussion regarding this trend see Leflar, supra note 81. See also
Wex S. Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 1981 UTAH L.
REv. 91 (1981).
85. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 101-115 and accompanying text.
88. See Skar v. City of Lincoln, 599 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1979) (patient found to
be negligent after he gave physician materially false and misleading information
about himself, his medical history, his family history, and his next of kin); Fall v.
White, 449 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (a patient must use reasonable care
in giving an accurate medical history to his physician and failure to do so may
constitute contributory negligence); Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp.,
459 N.W.2d 178 (Neb. 1990) (defense of contributory negligence recognized as
appropriate when patient intentionally gives erroneous, incomplete or
misleading information); McKoy v. Furlong, 590 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(failure to provide accurate patient history may preclude a finding of negligence
on the part of the physician).
1994]
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mation which the physician does not solicit from him.89 This
qualification is based on the theory that the patient is not obli-
gated to diagnose his own condition.90 The physician is responsi-
ble for making necessary inquiries.9 ' In addition, the patient does
not have to reiterate the information to each of the attending per-
sonnel. 92 The patient is negligent "if a reasonably prudent person
would know that the history was false and misleading."93 How-
ever, if the patient knows the physician is not aware of, or has not
inquired about, a condition that subjects the patient to a risk of
danger, then his failure to provide the physician with such infor-
mation is "unreasonable under the circumstances."94
b. Refusal to Cooperate with Physician in Diagnosis or Treat-
ment. The patient has an obligation to cooperate with the physi-
cian in both diagnosis and treatment.95 A patient who refuses to
allow the physician to treat him is responsible for any injury or
damage resulting from such refusal.9 6 In general, a patient is
89. Mackey v. Greenview Hosp. Inc., 587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(although the patient has a duty to provide accurate information, the physician
must ask questions sufficient to produce the information).
90. Id. See also Santoni v. Moodie, 452 A.2d 1223 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(patient not in a position to judge whether the prescribed course of treatment is
in his best interest and as a consequence cannot be negligent for following the
doctor's instructions/advice); O'Neil v. State, 323 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1971)
(patient not required to diagnose himself as a drug addict).
91. Mackey, 587 S.W.2d at 255.
92. Patient "was under no duty to reiterate her entire medical history to each
of the hospital personnel with whom she came in contact but was entitled to rely
upon the skill of her personal physician and the competence of the specialists
into whose care and keeping she had been committed for examination." Favalora
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544, 550 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
93. Mackey, 587 S.W.2d at 255.
94. Id. at 256.
95. Skar v. City of Lincoln, 599 F.2d 253, 260 (8th Cir. 1979) (patient has a
duty to cooperate with a treating physician to the extent he is able which
includes providing accurate information upon request); Hunter v. United States,
236 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Tenn. 1964) (failure of a patient to follow the advice of the
physician or to submit to treatment will negate any liability of the physician
which includes the failure to obtain consent to treatment); Stager v. Schneider,
494 A.2d 1307 (D.C. 1985) (patient has a duty to cooperate with her doctor in
proper diagnosis and treatment which does not include a requirement that the
patient inquire about test results); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (failure to submit to reasonable life-saving treatment based upon
religious beliefs reduces the patient's recovery).
96. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 80 (1987).
112 [Vol. 16:103
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bound to submit to treatment which a physician of ordinary skill
would prescribe.97
A disproportionate number of cases have involved the
patient's refusal of treatment based upon religious beliefs.98 In
determining whether such refusal should constitute contributory
negligence the courts are faced with constitutional implications.9 9
In general, the courts have held that denying recovery or reducing
recovery when a patient refuses treatment based upon religious
beliefs does not violate the First Amendment. 100
c. Failure to Return for Further Treatment as Instructed or Fail-
ure to Follow Other Instructions.
(i) Failure to Return for Further Treatment. Once the patient has
consulted the physician for treatment and the physician has
begun treatment, the failure of the patient to return for further
treatment will generally constitute contributory negligence.1 '
Some courts have reduced damages rather than barring recovery
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 277 (1991) (free exercise clause not violated by application of mitigation of
damages doctrine where patient would not receive blood based on religious
beliefs); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (free exercise
clause not violated by allocation of liability to patient who refused blood
transfusion based upon religious beliefs). But see Montgomery v. Board of
Retirement of Kern County Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181
(1973) (violated free exercise clause to deny retirement benefits based on refusal
to undergo surgery due to religious beliefs).
99. See Munn, 924 F.2d at 574; Corlett, 562 N.E.2d at 263.
100. See Munn, 924 F.2d at 574; Corlett, 562 N.E.2d at 263.
101. Roers v. Engebretson, 479 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (nine month
delay in returning to doctor contributed to increase in size of tumor); Grippe v.
Momtazee, 705 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (failure to return as instructed
contributed to the doctor's failure to diagnose cancer at an early stage); Donathon
v. McConnell, 193 P.2d 819 (Mont. 1948) (patient who failed to return to dentist,
after being instructed to do so, was barred from recovery); Mecham v. McLeay,
227 N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 1975) (patient was negligent in not making an
appointment to see her doctor professionally after he instructed her to do so);
Williams v. Wurdemann, 128 P. 639 (Wash. 1912) (a patient who employs a
physician to treat him, receives proper treatment, fails to return for further
treatment and suffers injury as a consequence is barred from recovey);
Sanderson v. Moline, 499 P.2d 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (termination of
treatment is a factor to be considered in establishing damages but does not
relieve the defendant of liability for damage up to time of discontinuance of
treatment). But see Maertins v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 328 P.2d 494 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958) (refused to apply contributory negligence where there was no
evidence the patient's failure to return was a proximate cause of the injury).
19941 113
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when the physician's negligence occurred prior to the patient's
failure to return for further treatment. 10 2 These courts have con-
cluded that even though the physician was negligent, the patient's
subsequent withdrawal from treatment increased the injury or
damage incurred.'0 3
The patient is, however, allowed to recover when the patient
quits the physician's treatment due to a belief that the physician
has treated him negligently. 0 4 In addition, employing another
physician under these circumstances does not constitute negli-
gence on the part of the patient.105 In fact, the failure to consult
another physician after withdrawing from a negligent physician's
treatment may prevent the patient from recovering. 106
Generally, to successfully assert the contributory negligence
defense, the physician must instruct the patient to return for
treatment. 0 7 If the physician considers the treatment complete
and does not order the patient to return, the patient cannot be
negligent in failing to return. 08 In addition, a mere delay in seek-
102. Quinones v. Public Adm'r, 373 N.Y.S.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)
(patient's failure to follow instructions subsequent to the physician's negligence
reduces damages to the degree such failure increased the extent of the injury).
See also Heller v. Medine, 377 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Bird v.
Pritchard, 291 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
103. See, e.g., Quinones, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 226; Heller, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 102;
Bird, 291 N.E.2d at 771-72.
104. Halverson v. Zimmerman, 232 N.W. 754 (N.D. 1930) (discharge of
physician by a patient who believes he has been injured by the negligence of the
physician and who subsequently employs another physician does not constitute
contributory negligence).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 759. "The patient is not bound to call in other physicians, unless he
becomes fully aware that the physician has not been, and is not, giving proper
treatment." Id. See also Rahn v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Ga. 1963).
107. Lauderdale v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (a
sufficient warning of the importance in returning must be given to the patient);
Sorina v. Armstrong, 554 N.E.2d 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (patient given
sufficient information and instruction to know follow-up care was necessary and
failure to return for such care was negligence).
108. Wells v. Woman's Hosp. Found., 286 So. 2d 439 (La. Ct. App. 1973), writ
denied, 288 So. 2d 646 (La. 1974) (patient who was told to go home and was not
told to return for treatment was not negligent in failing to keep later
appointment); Corbett v. Weisband, 551 A.2d 1059 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), appeal
denied, 569 A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1989), and appeal denied sub nom. Corbett v.
DeMoura, 571 A-2d 383 (Pa. 1989), and appeal denied sub noma. Petition of
DeMoura, 571 A.2d 383 (Pa. 1989) (patient discharged from hospital by physician
cannot be contributorily negligent).
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ing treatment or returning for further treatment will not relieve
the physician from his duty to provide the patient with proper
treatment under the circumstances. 10 9
(ii) Failure to Follow Other Instructions. The failure to follow
other instructions or advice, excluding failure to return for further
treatment, may also be a basis for contributory negligence. 110 "'It
is the duty of the patient to follow the reasonable instructions and
submit to the reasonable treatment prescribed by his physician or
surgeon.'" '1 The courts appear to distinguish between two situa-
tions in this context: (1) situations in which such a failure is the
proximate cause of the injury or damage; and (2) situations in
which such a failure occurs subsequent to the physician's negli-
gence. 1 2 To constitute a bar to recovery the patient's negligence
"must unite in producing the injury.""l3 If the patient's negligence
is subsequent to the physician's negligence then the patient's
damages are reduced, "preventing recovery to the extent the
patient's injury was aggravated or increased by his own negli-
gence."" 4 The patient may, however, disregard instructions or
advice which are improper. 115
109. LaRoche v. United States, 730 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1984) (four month delay
in returning for further treatment did not relieve dentist of duty of proper care
under the circumstances which included considering whether to recommence the
original treatment).
110. Songer v. Bowman, 804 P.2d 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (damages reduced
due to patient's failure to follow advice regarding use of medication); Harris v.
Cacdac, 512 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (although patient's negligence in
failing to follow advice to exercise her neck following surgery was subsequent to
the physician's negligence, a reduction of damages may be appropriate); Fall v.
White, 449 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (patient negligent due to failure to
submit to blood test and return for further evaluation as instructed); Eoff v. Hal
& Charlie Peterson Found., 811 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (patient
negligent due to failure to follow physician's advice to return to emergency room).
The following cases recognized the rule but found it inapplicable due to a lack of
proximate cause. Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home, 290 A.2d 375 (Me. 1972);
Hackathorn v. Lester E. Cox Medical Ctr., 824 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 459 N.W.2d 178 (Neb. 1990).
111. Josselyn v. Dearborn, 62 A.2d 174, 181 (Me. 1948) (citing Merrill v.
Odiorne, 94 A. 753 [(Me. 1915)]). See also Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home,
290 A.2d at 382.
112. Harris v. Cacdac, 512 N.E.2d at 1139-40.
113. Id. at 1140.
114. Id. at 1140.
115. See Dunn v. Catholic Medical Ctr., 389 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
("While a patient is justified in disregarding instructions which are improper, the
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2. Circumstances in Which the Defense Has Failed
There are several prevalent circumstances under which the
courts have concluded the defense of contributory negligence is
not appropriate. First "[t]he physician-patient relationship per-
mits a patient to rely on a doctor's professional skill and
advice."116 A patient who acts according to his doctor's instruc-
tions and incurs injury or damage as a result is not negligent. 1 17
Second, since a patient is entitled to rely on the physician's profes-
sional skill and advice, recovery for the physician's negligence is
not barred or reduced by failing to consult a second physician or
obtain a second opinion unless the patient has reason to believe he
is not being properly treated. 1 18 "It is not contributory negligence
to follow the advice of a physician without distrusting the physi-
cian and appealing to other physicians to check the opinion."119
The patient is not required to question the physician's instruc-
tions or advice prior to following them unless fully aware the
treatment is not proper. Third, another category relates to the
physician's failure or inability to communicate test results and the
patient's subsequent failure to inquire about the test results. Gen-
erally, the patient does not have a duty to inquire about test
results. 120 To place such a duty on the patient would "invert the
duty by transferring it from the health professional to the
patient." 1 2 1
patient has the duty to exercise reasonable care."). The fact patterns discussed
above are the most common circumstances in which the courts have either
barred or reduced the patient's damages based upon contributory negligence, but
are by no means the sole fact patterns under which the defense may be
successful. See, e.g., Tisdale v. Johnson, 339 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(patient took drug for eight years without telling doctor of side effects); Ray v.
Wagner, 176 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 1970) (virtually impossible for a doctor to
communicate with a patient who has no phone and provides misleading
information); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148 (N.J. 1988) (not unfair to expect
patient to help avoid consequences of condition treated for, which includes
honoring dietary restrictions, testing blood sugar and eliminating smoking).
116. Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah 1988).
117. 61 AM. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 303 (1981). See
infra note 118 and accompanying text.
118. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 80 (1987).
119. Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d at 1388. See also Lawrence v. Wirth, 309
S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1983); Santoni v. Moodie, 452 A.2d 1223 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1982).
120. Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307 (D.C. 1985); Ray v. Wagner, 176
N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 1970).
121. Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d at 1312.
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Finally, the defense of contributory negligence has also been
asserted by physicians when patients in their care commit suicide.
The courts unanimously hold that where there is a duty to prevent
suicide, the suicide which results as a breach of that duty cannot
establish a defense to liability for breach of that duty.122 Thus, a
patient with suicidal tendencies is not held to the same standard
of care of other patients, that of a reasonable person under the
circumstances. 123
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the few decisions in North Carolina addressing con-
tributory negligence in medical malpractice did not expressly
articulate it, prior to 1993 the courts appeared to be adamant in
protecting the patient and compensating the patient for injury or
damage suffered at the hands of the physician. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court addressed the issue of contributory negli-
gence in medical malpractice actions only twice prior to 1993.14
The court held in both cases that no contributory negligence
existed. In 1993, with McGill v. French,125 the supreme court
drastically shifted position by denying recovery to a patient based
upon his own negligent contribution to his injury for the first time.
122. See Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst. Inc., 372 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988),
affid, 382 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. 1989); McNamara v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139
(Mass. 1989); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159 (N.J. 1988); Hoeffner v. The
Citadel, 429 S.E.2d 190 (S.C. 1993). But see Bourne v. Seventh Ward Gen. Hosp.,
546 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (medical malpractice action brought against
physician for treatment subsequent to attempted suicided not barred by
negligence of patient in attempting suicide).
123. Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d at 162 (a mentally disturbed plaintiffs
conduct is measured in light of his mental condition). Once again these are not
the only circumstances under which the courts have rejected the defense of
contributory negligence, but they are the most litigated. For other cases in which
the contributory negligence defense was rejected, see Fabianke v. Weaver, 527
So. 2d 1253 (Ala. 1988) (unborn child cannot be guilty of contributory
negligence); Wheatley v. Heideman, 102 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa 1960) (two year old
child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence); Kelly v. Carroll, 219 P.2d 79
(Wash. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950) (patient does not assume the risk
of incompetent treatment by a drugless healer).
124. See Powell v. Shull, 58 N.C. App. 68, 293 S.E.2d 259 (1982), rev. denied,
306 N.C. 743, 295 S.E.2d 479 (1982); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247
S.E.2d 287 (1978).
125. McGill v. French, 333 N.C. 209, 424 S.E.2d 108 (1993).
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A. Preliminary Issues
1. Basis of the Jury Verdict
In McGill the court was faced with two preliminary issues.
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the court of
appeals erred in presuming defendant's negligence was based
upon only one of several allegations of negligence. 126 The court of
appeals presumed the defendant's negligence was based upon the
failure to inform plaintiff of the cancer diagnosis. 127 The court of
appeals concluded that since plaintiff had no knowledge of the ill-
ness he could not be negligent.1 28 Plaintiff stated seven different
allegations of negligence' 29 and offered evidence to support at
least four.13 0 The jury could have based its verdict upon any one of
the allegations supported by evidence. The court held that a
reviewing court cannot determine the basis for a jury's verdict
absent clear proof of that basis.131 This decision is consistent with
prior decisions of the court, some of which the court made refer-
ence to.
1 3 2
2. Proximate Cause
The second preliminary issue addressed by the court was
whether proximate cause in medical malpractice cases required
medical expert testimony. 133 The standard to be applied was
clearly established in previous cases; 1 therefore, the court
quickly disposed of the issue.
126. Id., at 215, 424 S.E.2d at 111.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 47.
130. McGill, 333 N.C. at 215, 424 S.E.2d at 111-12.
131. Id. at 216, 424 S.E.2d at 112.
132. The cases cited by the court were factually different from McGill, yet they
affirmed the principle propounded by the court. See, Bittle v. Jarrell, 270 N.C.
266, 154 S.E.2d 43 (1967) (the judge mistakenly used the word "defendant"
instead of "plaintiff" in his charge to the jury regarding contributory negligence);
Barber v. Heeden, 265 N.C. 682, 144 S.E.2d 886 (1965) (conflicting instructions
regarding burden of proof were given to the jury); In re Will of Shute, 251 N.C.
697, 111 S.E.2d 851 (1960) (conflicting instructions given to the jury and court
could not say the jury followed the correct one).
133. McGill, 333 N.C. at 218, 424 S.E.2d at 113.
134. See Chapman v. Pollock, 69 N.C. App. 588, 594, 317 S.E.2d 726, 731
(1984); Powell v. Shull, 58 N.C. App. 68, 71, 293 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1982), rev.
denied, 306 N.C. 743, 295 S.E.2d 479 (1982); Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium &
Asheville Agric. Sch., 234 N.C. 222, 227 67 S.E.2d 57, 61-62 (1951).
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Although under the general rule the plaintiff is required to
establish a causal connection between the negligence of the physi-
cian and the injury by medical expert testimony, 135 an exception
exists if the jury "based on its common knowledge and experience,
is able to understand and judge the action of a physician or sur-
geon. " 13 6 The court applied this same exception to the causal rela-
tionship between the patient's negligence and the injury. 1 37 Based
upon the standard of care required of a plaintiff, "that of a person
of ordinary prudence acting under the same or similar circum-
stances," the court reasoned that the jury, "based on its own
knowledge and experience," could determine whether the failure
to return for follow-up care or the failure to call contributed to the
rate of spread of the disease.'3 This rule was adopted and applied
in previous cases;139 however, since contributory negligence has
seldom been addressed in medical malpractice cases in North Car-
olina the analysis performed by the court was necessary.
B. The Contributory Negligence Issue
The court's remaining analysis centered on whether the
defendant had met his burden of proof. "A party asserting the
defense of contributory negligence has the burden of proof of such
defense." 140 The plaintiff is not required to prove he/she was not
negligent. The court defined the issue as being whether the trial
court erred in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to
the jury where the evidence consisted of the plaintiffs failure to
keep one or more appointments with the defendant physician. 4 '
The court resolved the issue on the basis of applicable precedent
and expert testimony given at trial. 142
1. Precedent: Powell v. Shull
a. Application of the Facts to the Rule in Other Jurisdictions.
The court compared and contrasted the case with a previous deci-
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1975 & Supp. 1992); Moore v. Reynolds, 63
N.C. App. 160, 163, 303 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1983); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C.
App. 50, 54, 247 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1978).
136. Powell, 58 N.C. App. at 71, 293 S.E.2d at 262. See also Chapman, 69 N.C.
App. at 594, 317 S.E.2d at 731; Jackson, 234 N.C. at 227, 67 S.E.2d at 61-62.
137. McGill, 333 N.C. at 219, 424 S.E.2d at 114.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
141. McGill, 333 N.C. at 219, 424 S.E.2d at 114.
142. Id. at 218-21, 424 S.E.2d at 113-15.
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sion, Powell v. Shull, 1 3 a case in which the defendant also
asserted contributory negligence based upon the patient's failure
to keep appointments.' 4  In Powell, the plaintiff alleged Dr.
Shull had negligently treated her between April 17, 1977 and
August 2, 1977 for a fractured arm.145 The court found there was a
progressive slippage and an increase in displacement of the frac-
ture. 146 The displacement was estimated by a radiologist to be
100% by July 1, 1977.147 The plaintiff had kept all appointments
during that period.14  The plaintiffs failure to return to Dr.
Shull's office did not occur until after August 2, 1977, which was
subsequent to Dr. Shull's alleged negligence; therefore, the court
held that she could not have been negligent. 149 In addition, the
court noted that there was no evidence to indicate that the degree
of deformity in her arm would have been decreased by anything
she did prior to or after August 2, 1977.150
The court's conclusion in Powell was logical. A patient's negli-
gence which occurs subsequent to the physician's negligence can-
not contribute to the injury incurred on that prior date. However,
most courts would go one step further and reduce the damages
recoverable due to subsequent negligence which aggravated the
injury.'15 These courts would reduce recovery in proportion to any
increase in the injury from the time plaintiff left defendant's care
until plaintiff consulted the second physician.' 5 2 The court did not
consider such a reduction and focused only on any injury received
while in the defendant's care prior to the missed appointments.
The court stated there was a lack of evidence to prove anything
plaintiff did after leaving the defendant's care aggravated the
injury. 15 3 Reduction of damages was not considered in McGill
either. The court did not address the plausibility of allocating neg-
143. Powell v. Shull, 58 N.C. App. 68, 293 S.E.2d 259 (1982), rev. denied, 306
N.C. 743, 295 S.E.2d 479 (1982).
144. Id. at 76, 293 S.E.2d at 263.
145. Id. at 76, 293 S.E.2d at 264.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 77, 293 S.E.2d at 264.
149. Id.
150. Id. The court's conclusions were not supported by any precedent in the
opinion.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114. See also Tellier, supra note 5,
at 1047 (summarizing the general rule).
152. See supra text accompanying note 114.
153. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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ligence between Mr. McGill and the defendant. Instead, once the
court determined there was contributory negligence, recovery was
barred.
b. Distinguishing Powell and McGill. In applying Powell to the
McGill facts, the court distinguished the two cases. The "critical
difference" the court noted was that Mr. McGill failed to keep
appointments "during a crucial time of his illness," whereas the
plaintiffs injury in Powell reached its worst while she was attend-
ing scheduled appointments.15 4 In September and October 1983,
Dr. French instructed Mr. McGill to return for treatment upon
experiencing pain or other symptoms. 55 Mr. McGill experienced
weight loss and weakness from the time he was released from the
hospital in September 1983 until December 1983, yet Mr. McGill
did not contact Dr. French. 156 From December 1983 until June
1984 Mr. McGill was weak and could not do things which he nor-
mally could do without having to stop and rest, yet he did not con-
tact Dr. French. 157 Mr. McGill was told of the importance of
keeping scheduled appointments and of contacting Dr. French
upon the first sign of symptoms but disregarded both instruc-
tions. 15 8 The court concluded that, unlike the plaintiff in Powell, if
Mr. McGill had appeared at his scheduled appointments and
returned to Dr. French's office as he was instructed, then the can-
cer might not have spread as fast as it did.' 59
A distinction between the two cases which may aid in recon-
ciliation of the decisions is the character of the defendant's con-
duct. The defendant in Powell had given no indication he was
going to perform further surgery and in fact told the plaintiff the
fracture was healing and that she could return to work and chop
wood.16 0 The defendant in McGill specifically instructed the plain-
tiff on the need to return upon the first sign of pain or other symp-
toms so that treatment could begin.' 6 ' The defendant in Powell
gave every indication that no further treatment or surgery was to
154. McGill, 333 N.C. at 220, 424 S.E.2d at 114.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
156. McGill, 333 N.C. at 220, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying note 26.
159. McGill, 333 N.C. at 221, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
160. Powell, 58 N.C. App. at 72-3, 293 S.E.2d at 262.
161. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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be performed. 162 Had the plaintiff in McGill returned for sched-
uled appointments as instructed, treatment would have been com-
menced; whereas, in Powell further treatment was not
contemplated.
The court found that Mr. McGill's failure to contact Dr.
French or any other physician upon experiencing the first symp-
toms was most damaging to his case. 163 The fact that Mr. McGill
failed to keep scheduled appointments was recognized, yet this
fact received less emphasis than the fact that he failed to follow
Dr. French's instructions and to return upon the first sign of
symptoms.
The allegation of contributory negligence in Powell was also
based upon the failure to keep scheduled appointments.16 4 The
court's deemphasis of the failure to keep scheduled appointments
in McGill and the court's holding of no contributory negligence in
Powell suggests that the failure to keep scheduled appointments
by itself may not be enough when alleging contributory negligence
in North Carolina contrary to holdings in other jurisdictions. 165
2. Expert Medical Testimony
Powell was the only precedent from which the court drew its
opinion; however, the court referred to expert medical testimony
given at trial.166 This testimony addressed three issues. First, the
testimony addressed the societal change in attitude toward the
physician-patient relationship. 16 7 The experts emphasized that
the responsibility for a patient's well-being is shared by the physi-
cian and patient. 168 The patient's responsibility, they postulated,
includes keeping scheduled appointments. 69 Second, the expert
testimony indicated that even if Mr. McGill was not informed that
he had cancer, as he alleged, there would have been symptoms
162. The emphasis on returning generally required in other jurisdictions, see
supra note 107 and accompanying text, was missing in Powell. In fact, in Powell
there appeared to be a total lack of such emphasis.
163. McGill, 333 N.C. at 220, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
164. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
166. McGill, 333 N.C. at 220-21, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
167. Id.
168. McGill, 333 N.C. at 220-21, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
169. Id.
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sufficient to cause the reasonable person to return. 7 ' Finally, the
testimony showed that cancer does not spread as fast once treat-
ment has began.17
1
While the court recognized Mr. McGill was told at least twice
of the importance of keeping appointments, this factor did not
appear to play a major role in the decision. The court came to the
ultimate conclusion that whether or not Dr. French told Mr.
McGill he had cancer was irrelevant. 172 According to the court, if
Mr. McGill had kept his scheduled appointments and followed the
instructions, Dr. French would have been able to begin treatment
as planned and the spreading of the cancer would have been
slowed. 173 The court's analysis is counter to the analysis of courts
in other jurisdictions which hold that the patient must be made
aware of the importance of returning for follow-up visits. 174 Thus,
North Carolina broadened the ability of the physician to avoid lia-
bility by allowing the contributory negligence defense even when
such emphasis is not given to the importance of return visits.
Even if Dr. French told Mr. McGill to return upon the first
sign of pain or other symptoms, the message to Mr. McGill would
be weak unless Dr. French told him that he was diagnosed with
cancer. It strains reasoning to think the emphasis of keeping
appointments would have the same bearing upon the patient if he
was told he had cancer as when such diagnosis was not revealed.
The court did not adopt the requirement in other jurisdictions that
emphasis must be given the importance of returning for follow-up
care. The emphasis appears to be upon the failure to follow a doc-
tor's instructions to return whether impressed upon the patient or
not.
McGill not only opened the door to physicians to use the
defense of contributory negligence in cases where the patient fails
to follow instructions and return for follow-up care but also gave
the defense in such actions a much broader application than other
jurisdictions give it. The primary consideration in future cases
170. These symptoms experienced by Mr. McGill were not articulated in the
opinion but probably related to the defendant's emphasis on the need to return.
See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
171. McGill, 333 N.C. at 221, 424 S.E.2d at 115.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (M.D. Ala.
1987) (a patient cannot be contributorily negligent in failing to return if he is not
given sufficient notice that his return is essential to his well being).
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will be whether or not the court really meant the decision to be
read that broadly.
The court did not define when the defense was appropriate,
which is consistent with other jurisdictions that determine the
extent of application on a case by case basis. There appears to be a
strong consensus among the members of the court shown by the
lack of either dissenting or concurring opinions. Attorneys repre-
senting physicians, as well as patients, in medical malpractice
actions will be on edge awaiting future cases to clarify the court's
position.
V. CONCLUSION
By barring recovery in a medical malpractice action due to the
patient's contributory negligence, the North Carolina Supreme
Court opened the door for physicians to avoid liability for negli-
gent conduct. McGill held a patient may be barred from recover-
ing in a medical malpractice action if the patient fails to follow the
physician's instructions or advice by not keeping scheduled
appointments and returning as instructed. The holding marks a
drastic change in position by a court which has never upheld the
defense of contributory negligence in a medical malpractice action.
North Carolina has fallen in line behind the majority of jurisdic-
tions which have allowed the defense in medical malpractice
actions for years.
Since the holding in this landmark decision was limited to the
facts of the case, there can be no prediction on the direction the
court will take with respect to the holding. The court could either
broaden its application of the defense or limit it to narrow, specific
situations. Only the test of future litigation will render an answer.
However, one aspect of the case which will doubtless cause
future controversy, as the issue does in negligence cases outside of
medical malpractice, is the complete bar to recovery. Reduction of
damages appears to be a better approach than a complete bar. The
patient suffers injury at the hands of the physician; however, even
if the patient's negligence is miniscule, recovery is barred. The
court is unlikely to change the long standing rule that contribu-
tory negligence is a complete bar to recovery and patients will suf-
fer under it. Thus, the holding in McGill is likely to have two
effects in the future: (1) patients will be discouraged from bringing
medical malpractice actions; and (2) physicians will be encouraged
now more than ever to raise the defense of contributory negli-
gence. The shift in position by the court reflects the change in soci-
124 [Vol. 16:103
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/4
1994] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION 125
etal attitude to the physician-patient relationship but fails to
reflect the societal disfavor for the contributory negligence
defense.
Lucinda L. Fraley
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